This article takes the example of a disappeared altar in a Himalayan valley as revelatory of contradictions within the mechanics of a Hui Muslim revitalization project. The community example-a group of historically identifiable Muslims in China-centers on the disappearance of a gifted propitiation altar that once stood as an instantiation of community cohesion among ethnically varied populations in the valley. The investigation examines transformations of modernity and the erosion of the "social glue" that held valley communities together as the disappearance of this gift is revealed to be a telling instance of the large-scale productivities and corrosions effected by China's contemporary renaissance of reemerging religious movements and community identifications, processes in which Chinese Muslims serve as a potential indicator for a long view of reform contemporary social transformation.
Context
The families of Dragon Village make up a Hui community whose historical footprint must be traced back through local and transregional history in order to understand their place in this remote location. Luckily, the village mayor compiled a local history worth consulting in this regard, and a brief excerpt from it can help this analysis 8 :
In the 1920s in the northwest part of China's Yunnan Province, near the foot of Haba Mountain [5300m], a few weary families settled. The fierce high plateau sun beat down on them as their journey came to an end, a journey the footsteps of which led all the way back to the Shaanxi Bai You Fu uprising. After that uprising failed, a group of Muslim combatants was forced to give up their fertile lands and retreat. In 1856, 9 they reached a Tibetan area near Zhongdian (now Xianggelila), where they used their mining experience and wisdom to establish a silver business called the Bao Xing Silver Factory.
Their bravery and industriousness were rewarded by prosperity and wealth, which eventually caused them to be preyed on by bandits. Under threat, they could only flee with their lives, retreating south again to settle in the small Annan Village among Tibetans. In this even more remote place, legend has it that Allah sent an ingenious guide to help them prosper. A man out hunting killed an eagle and found a large gold nugget inside its stomach. This gift from Allah led them to find a source of gold, on which they built a new gold processing factory. Their once again prosperous population soon grew to several thousand, but with this gift Allah was again testing them. This wealth again enticed bandits and local men of great influence to attack and kill members of the community. Many died in the violence, including their leader, a man known as Yang Keye. 10 The surviving community members fled once more, ending up finally at the present site of Dragon Village.
Thanks to Allah, they survived hardships and the harsh environment. Preparing new fields, renting land from neighbors, and tending animals, they again began to thrive through hard work. Although life was hard, they never gave up their beliefs. They managed to build a simple mosque and live a life of faith, but Allah always tests the faithful. Their grain, animals, and valuables again came to be targets for local bandits, but this great minzu 11 never succumbed. Their continued struggle only brought out the fierceness within them as they took up weapons to fight and protect their ethnic pride.
In 1949, the Chinese nation [zhonghua minzu] ended its semicolonial, semifeudal society and constructed a great socialist country in Asia. All brother nationality groups became joined as hands and feet are to a body, demonstrating an ever-progressing image. Even then the disastrous Cultural Revolution also reached this poor village, and many imams ended their lives during the "Smash the Four Olds" campaign, may Allah grant them the peace of heaven. 12 In this whirlwind of chaos, religious teachings were lost, and by the 1980s only a very basic knowledge of Islam remained. Yet through the eighty years of difficulty and disaster, they never lost their sense of minzu pride. Though they strayed from the strict practices of Islam, they still proudly counted themselves as Muslims and continued to be concerned with the great community of Islam. The Persian Gulf War caused them great concern, and the trials and triumphs of world Islam have always had an impact on this wayward group of Muslims.
Happily, in the last year of the twentieth century they are looking forward to a future of guidance from Allah. With the help of the Shadian 13 Muslims, they are able to take the road proper Muslims should walk-a path that will lead them to a deeper understanding of the teachings of Allah. It is on this road where they will find a stronger faith in Islam and be able to thrive on Haba Mountain. May Allah grant them lasting peace and prosperity.
As I translated the mayor's account, it occurred to me that I might be able to identify the original conflict in Shaanxi that caused the Dragon Villagers' original exodus. I had never heard of the Bai You Fu uprising, but the fact that it involved Muslims would make it easier to locate if there were any records at all. After noting the Shaanxi origin, the name, and the nature of the story, and with some help from historian Jonathan Lipman, I discovered that the hostilities identified in the narrative as the Bai You Fu conflict turn out to almost certainly refer to a Hui leader named Bai Yanhu"
14 He was the head of the losing side of a Hui-Hui conflict in late nineteenth-century Shaanxi that resulted in the defeated population fleeing into what was then imperial Russia. Why some part of that group ended up in Yunnan is unknown, but the Dragon Villagers are in all likelihood descendants of part of this migrant Shaanxi Hui population that fled China after their defeat only to return and hide out in the Himalayas. They eventually intermarried with and often became Tibetan or Naxi, with only a peculiar remembered history of being Hui from Shaanxi. This memory became particularly useful in 1999 when Dragon Village began to seek development funds from other Hui in the region, a strategy the villagers eventually understood to involve a creative effort to differentiate themselves from their neighbors.
Remembered local history-never particularly detailed, but rich with potential-was thus recalled, reinstantiated, and re-energized at the turn of the twenty-first century in a revitalization project displaying both contemporary and historical dynamics.
Given that this remote group of migrants is demonstrated to be a historically identifiable
Hui population that left traces of its passage elsewhere, 15 an understanding of this migration, its causes, and its ramifications can also illuminate the arc of China's tumultuous modernity, the dynamics of internal struggle through the republican period, or any number of other, more specific types of transformations among frontier and marginal peoples in China. For the purposes of this article, it is enough to point out that the narrative foregrounds a process of becoming. this focus on the process of continual (re)creation of people and their communities (even temporally distant historical ones) in the present course of living that is maintained here as an analytical strategy. Dragon Village's historical origin story is here told for present purposes, and thus renarrated according to the needs of present agents. The parts of it meant to satisfy both Shadian benefactors and the rhetorically socialist cum energetically market capitalist surveillance state are evident, but there are still other parts that inform this analysis.
A notable element in the origin story is the community's productive utilization of mining skills associated with the Shaanxi region.
16 That this valuable technology is lost over time despite the wealth that it brings, resulting in a primarily agricultural community, is a story of transformation from relative pride and sophistication (and error) to relative humility and simplicity (but truth). This explanation is a powerful narrative of revitalization adapted to the brute realities of a radically changing world, where a community reshapes preexisting social ideals and practices in order to better accommodate different social and material parameters.
Interestingly, this outlines a civilizing narrative quite apart from what one might expect, with ruralization and simplicity being "achieved" in this particular moral economy after a series of "tests" by Allah. According to one contemplative informant, the trials and tribulations of this small band of frontier Muslims can be seen as a moral tale of incremental education (by Allah)
away from the desire for wealth-which is invariably accompanied by problems like bandits and violence-toward the desire for a Muslim lifestyle involving purity of heart and simplicity of life-which brings strength to resist the hardships of the world. Yet this theologically powerful moral tale was a motivating component of only a small percentage of the village population.
Another understanding of the origin narrative's significance diverged only slightly, suggesting again that the migration story was best seen as a lesson in the proper Muslim way of life, but in a different fashion. In this version, the original conflict in Shaanxi is remembered as that of a conflict between neighbors who could not agree on issues of religious practice or interpretation-an accurate suggestion given the Sufi-order (menhuan) differences that often engender intra-Muslim violence in Gansu and Shaanxi. 17 The tortuous path of these wayward goal if they persist in the journey, even though it is long, difficult, and without a certain destination.
18 Still, this second moral narrative was also only rarely invoked in Dragon Villagers' attempts to understand their own past or their prospects for the future. Diverging dramatically from these interpretations were others that made up the majority opinion of the village population, and were instead motivated by more practical concerns, like access to material and symbolic resources. To most, the moral valence of the narrative is less important than the fact that it identified a specific kind of people-a kind that dovetailed with reform contemporary understandings of minzu as legitimate and socially valuable. 19 In this respect, the narrative served as a politically meaningful and materially practical story of how the villagers were once Hui and how they could best become Hui "again," in a powerful way that would give them access to development funds, tourist income, and social recognition.
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Mystery and Revitalization
As previously mentioned, the altar had disappeared by 2011. To put it another way, the ethnically crosscutting gift from one neighbor to another had vanished. The exact circumstances of the disappearance remain unclear, yet certain trends that help to explain it could already be seen in 2002. For more than a decade now Dragon Village has undergone revitalization, the salient characteristics of which serve to demonstrate elements of an epistemological transformation that is either in its very late stages or has already ended, depending on whom you ask. I refer here to the empire-to-nation-form shift that began roughly around the first Chinese
Republic and has now, in the fullness of the second Republic, become internalized and hegemonic. This modernity has many elements, but it is the iterative and thorough transformation of peoples and traditions into ethnic groups and religions that draw our attention here as epistemic changes the consequences of which cannot really be predicted.
The issue of community revitalization in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is important because it is an example of a phenomenon receiving much energy in China today, with
Buddhists, Christians, Daoists, Muslims, and Confucians all said to be undergoing some kind of resurgence. This noted efflorescence of communities is, of course, not limited to religion. Indeed, I privilege the term "Hui revitalization" rather than "Muslim revitalization" because I find the Huiness of these Muslims to be a more precise analytical tool than their religious practices.
Nonetheless, Islam is a key element in being Hui, so the fact that the Dragon Village Hui think that an increased degree of piety and orthodox religious practice would benefit the village population by making them healthier and bringing them closer to Allah.
Consequences
In their haste to realize these assorted dreams, it is perhaps understandable that Dragon
Village residents ignored the fact that nobody had the same goals in mind. Given the overpowering poverty in the area, forward movement of any kind was enough. In this, they were hardly different from many other revitalization movements. Without relying on his overly rigid analytical stages, we can see in anthropologist Anthony Wallace's classic work a usefulness in defining revitalization movements as "deliberate, conscious, organized efforts by members of a society to create a more satisfying culture" when their basic needs are not being met (Wallace 1956, 279) . Directed though this effort was for Dragon Villagers, what occurred was cacophony rather than concert-something I suspect is often the norm with such movements initially.
Pursuing each specific interest separately under flexible categories like huifu jiaomen ("return to Celebrations and holidays had seen attendance from multiple ethnic and religious communities linked by collegial work relationships, multigenerational friendships, and mutual exchange, highlighted in the quotidian sharing of food and drink. But almost from the beginning of the revitalization, things began to change. The embodied engines of this change were the few young ahongs (imams) who had been sent from Shadian, the wealthy Hui community in southern Yunnan that was providing the funding for the village renaissance efforts. Initially there were six new ahongs, each nineteen or twenty years old. These young men, all of whom came from poor regions of Sichuan and Yunnan, had been trained at the community's expense in one of Shadian's many Islamic schools. Though their explanations of their situations differed considerably, they seemed to agree that only the poorer of the new ahongs from Shadian would consider a posting of any kind to such an impoverished and remote location as Dragon Village.
None had studied abroad, an option well beyond their means, and religious training had by their own accounting been their sole avenue of advancement and education. All were committed to the cause of Islam as they understood it, and all understood Huiness to be primarily a matter of Islam, regarding any ethnic or historical element it might have as secondary in importance.
Bringing a historically and theologically specific clarity of purpose, the ahongs had such activist zeal that a colleague took to informally calling them "born-again Muslims." While theologically problematic, the sentiment of this term is viscerally revealing. If one is predisposed to be charitable toward such people, then the phrase evokes a warm feeling of acceptance and understanding, whereas if one is predisposed to not be so charitable, then an equally visceral annoyance is felt. In Dragon Village, these new ahongs set out to immediately implement a series of interventions they believed would bring the villagers into the acceptable range of how Hui should best behave in the world. All village residents were encouraged to attend lectures and gatherings designed to teach them how to be Hui again. Basic Arabic classes were formed that any interested person could join. Teaching about Muslim propriety-including how to bathe properly, how to conduct oneself in prayer, and how to properly butcher animals-was carried out in a hands-on instructional manner as these matters arose. Sermons with practical religious content were given at least weekly. Young people were offered greater religious responsibilities, both in an attempt to order their lives vis-à-vis Islam and to curtail the usual labor flight that tended to draw them away from the village on adulthood. In each endeavor, the ahongs had how the Hui should behave, and who they are becoming, have generated discord between area communities. The two most visible ways of being Hui in this story-that remembered and that emerging-constitute two of many potentially viable ways of being and becoming that are available to Hui in Yunnan. From one primarily characterized by historical patterns of difference, but with fluid and flexible interaction, to another primarily organized by ethnoreligious type accompanied by a tendency toward separation and endogamy, each is a product of its prevailing sociocultural conditions. The manner and degree to which the members of the Dragon Village community interact with their neighbors has changed, and the unexpected qualities of this change have involved surprises for everyone concerned. The processes of this development show us some of the range of potential ways of being Hui, but they also provide the investigator with a case through which to see religious revitalization in China in concrete terms. The starts and stumbles in this change-the reasons for it, steps taken, difficulties encountered, successes achieved, and unintended consequences-illuminate not only the situation of one revitalizing Hui community in remote Yunnan, but also similar elements in the quotidian ways of being Chinese in a revitalizing twenty-first century. had decided-admirably, it was said-to collectively try to do something for their community since the state was failing to help them improve their lives. The five Naxi, Pumi, and Han men who had started wearing the caps either got them at the local market on their own, or were given them by Dragon Villagers as gifts. The Dragon Villagers either did not recognize this gesture as a problem, or actively recognized it in the positive, supportive, and friendly manner it was intended. In the rest of China, such a practice is unheard of. But here villagers greeted their capwearing neighbors in the garbled Arabic they had themselves learned just weeks or months before, and non-Hui (certainly non-Muslim) neighbors started trying their hand at using the "Assalamu alaykum" greeting.
Conclusion
30
At some point one of the young ahongs expressed dissatisfaction with this practice. I was not present for the comment, and he never admitted or explained it to me despite a general consensus that he was the original objector. Over time his stance came to be supported by certain villagers wanting to demonstrate their newfound propriety. They began to publically agree with the ahongs that non-Hui should not wear Muslim skullcaps, and after some months of growing disapproval from one contingent of the population, the collective playfulness of support and encouragement between neighbors on the issue melted slowly away…with one exception. One older non-Hui gentlemen from a neighboring village who tended yaks on one of the high pastures refused to stop wearing his skullcap, and refused to stop trying to greet everyone in his version of Arabic. He refused, as he pointed out, to stop doing "the right thing" (meaning to be friendly and demonstrate his camaraderie with his neighbors) just because some man "younger than one of his shoes" did not approve. Besides, he liked how the cap covered his bald head without making him sweat too much.
I took this fellow to be a reminder that local sociality can be tenacious, and I believe his example is revealing precisely because it points to a possible optimism both for the future of the valley and for a revitalizing China wracked with religious identification growing pains. It is this obscured optimism inherent in the now-anxious revitalization scene that I believe needs to be highlighted. When it comes to investigating the everyday realities of revitalizing Hui in a revitalizing China, the fact that some imaginations of identification resonate most strongly with religious practices is not surprising. Nonetheless, there are also other ways of being Hui under the sun, just as historian Zvi Ben Dor Benite has reminded us that there were several ways of Islamic excellence from present-day Yunnan, which she shows to include several more scholars, elegantly presents the position thus:
The genius of the Hui of bygone eras…was their ability to meld Islamic and…Chinese cultural elements. This melding was more than useful-it was and is who the Hui are. In advocating reform and challenging the isolationist tendencies of much contemporary religious education these Hui scholars, writers and cadres are trying to counter what they see as a false tradition with one that is "authentically" Hui.
32 (2005, (130) (131) McCarthy carefully points out that those involved in this argument about authenticity who are proponents of this synthesizing position on "real" Huiness also enjoy the support of the state.
Nonetheless, and I think correctly, she relies on her rich ethnographic evidence to conclude that the reality of this situation is far from being a mere expression of hegemonic state policy. Moreover, the history of these tensions-dating back to the nineteenth century's so-called 
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The Naxi are an officially recognized minzu (nationality or ethnic group) prominent in northwest Yunnan and often associated with Tibetans. 2
For a recent introduction to Dr. Rock, see part 2 of Mueggler (2011) . Many know of Rock by reputation-a problematic one-because he is said to have often sent his plant samples back along with grandiose claims about his contribution to knowledge, the stupendous height of the region's mountains (claiming some were taller than Everest), and other superlative assessments that proved inaccurate. All this eventually gained him a troublesome reputation in the West, and he was also thought very strange locally in that he usually ate alone; had a bad temper, which he often lost; and, though being of normal size (slightly over five feet tall), could eat an entire sheep in one sitting. 3
One of these stories has Haba Mountain (the village sits on a low shoulder of this mountain) as an anthropomorphized figure, along with the nearby Yulong Mountain as its brother and the Jinsha River as their sister who gets away from them (by running off between them) when they are supposed to be watching over her. 4
This nearby calcite terrace formation is another ritual center occasionally claimed to be the origin place of the Naxi. 5
These last two are geographic (and mythographically meaningful) features near or in Lijiang, which is a day's drive to the south of Dragon Village and the current center of the Naxi world. 6 This is the same man who reported that, as a child in the 1930s, his father caught one of Dr. Rock's pith helmets when it blew off while Rock was climbing up the mountain. He swore that his family still had this white or cream-colored artifact in a trunk somewhere, but I never got to see it. 7
This fact of common exogamy alone makes the Dragon Village Hui unusual among most of China's Muslims, who elsewhere tend very strongly toward endogamy. 8
Here it serves the ethnographic archival function, but originally the village mayor wanted to give this written history to the English-reading tourists whom he hoped would become interested in the natural beauty of the area. Being the first Westerner to live onsite for any length of time since Dr. Rock, I translated this history into English-at the mayor's request-in order to help the village with its self-presentation. The mayor also suggested that I include it in the "book" I was writing because it was from "the mouth of a real Hui" (jen huizude zuiba) and not something from the government. 9
This date is at best an approximation. Given the just-erupting Du Wenxiu uprising (Panthay Rebellion or southwest Muslim rebellion) that was to ravage Yunnan for seventeen years, the conditions in the decades after 1856 would have contributed to a need to stay up in the high mountains well away both from any potential retributive violence and from a provincial government predisposed to ill treatment of Hui. 10
This name-keye being a local title for a tax administration official-means "Tax Administrator Yang." The implication is that these Hui were associated with the man who was a recognized tax collector for subprefectural officialdom. 11
Minzu, which was usually translated as "nationality" before about 2009, eventually came to be translated as "ethnic group" or "ethnicity" and its derivatives thereafter. Naturally, the translation is imprecise and the complexities are many, but the gloss remains in common use today. For an early engagement with the concept of minzu that has stood scrutiny, see Gladney (1991) . For a more recent discussion of minzu as an episteme to be applied, see Mullaney (2011) . 12 Imams (ahong) "taking their own life" is a rhetorical image often used among Yunnan's Hui in narratives of hardship during the political movement or Cultural Revolution periods to mean that religion was forced into submission. No ahongs from Dragon Village-or anywhere else in the Hui communities I have visited in Yunnan, for that matter-actually took their own lives during this time.
13
Shadian is a Hui town in southeastern Yunnan famous for having been destroyed in the Cultural Revolution by provincial authorities overreacting to an attempt to resist outside interference. Verifiable details of this event are scarce, but the eventual outcome was an admission of error by the government, the rebuilding of the town, the expansion of the mosques and Islamic schools, and a de facto "hands-off" approach by the government. The town has become wealthy and more Islamic than ever. While a Muslim center before, it has become one of the rare points of entry for Islamic development funds from wealthy countries in the rest of the Muslim world. Thus it was through Shadian funding that Dragon Village was able to undertake its Hui renaissance (rebuild its mosque, hire ahongs, etc.), as explained below. 14 I thank Professor Lipman for taking the time to reverse translate this oral history term twisted by (in hindsight, predictable) Yunnan dialect pronunciation and temporal distance from its original "Bai Yanhu" (see Lipman 1998, 129; Houtsma 1993, 720 The Dragon Villagers, like most of Yunnan's Muslims, refuse to entertain the notion that the divisive Sufi orders can be an entirely legitimate form of Islam. This continued to be the prevailing position throughout the time I was there, and the theme of unity in the province's Islamic centers (Weishan, Dali, Chuxiong, Jianshui, Najiaying, Shadian, and Zhaotong) remains a cornerstone of the stories Hui there tell about themselves. As far as I was able to find, in 2002 there was only one mosque identified with Sufism left in the province. Even that one (in Kunming) was said to be either in the process of being rebuilt, or in the process of being demolished since the community had disintegrated, depending on who one asked. Agreement on this matter is despite some historical differences between these communities (see Atwill 1997 ).
19
For a discussion of the legitimacy and value issues of minzu in terms of tourism and selfrepresentation, see Schein (2000) . 20
The emphasis on the process of becoming Yunnanese Hui that their origin narrative draws into focus is significant because it highlights the moving target process of becoming. In fact, many of the village families experienced this process of becoming local in a more complete fashion. Several family branches are said to have, by the strength of local conditions alone, "become" Naxi or Tibetan, and today there are Tibetan Buddhist lamas in Zhongdian County who are blood relatives. One such Tibetan lama from the Annan area often came to Dragon Village when asked to chant sutras over the sickbeds of his Hui relatives. 21
The great "Admiral of the Three Jewels," Zheng He, the most famous Chinese personage outside of China then, and unquestionably Chinese at that, was born of a Hui family near Kunming. 22 We live in something of a golden age of frontier studies, where inquiries into the historical veracity and logic of minzu abound and our knowledge of the "non-Chinese" Chinese people is developing dramatically. After Gladney's work on the Hui, a flood of excellent anthropological and historical work focusing directly on China's frontier areas has enriched scholarship. For the beginning, see Gladney (1991) . For an interesting recent treatment by a historian, see Mullaney (2011). 23 Even the local manifestations of the state, by denying the village any other means of development and not dissuading the Hui revitalization, seemed to have some sort of goal in mind, though nobody was certain what this might have been. 24
The viewing of minority culture as a symbolic capital to be cashed in for economic development purposes has achieved a noble truth-like status in tourist areas of China (see Schein 2000) . 25
In 2002, electricity was only available for a few hours every other evening. 26 This is, of course, not the only example of revitalization among the Hui of Yunnan. Daispeaking Hui of Menghai in southwestern Yunnan are said to have successfully undergone a huifu jiaomen process in the 1980s with the help of the wealthy and conservative Najiaying community. One of my thesis students who recently conducted research in the area gathered some anecdotal evidence to the effect that this achievement may have been a more relative success. Michael Brose has also written on modernity through globalization in several other Yunnanese Hui communities (see Brose 2011). 27 One of the Shadian ahongs proudly laid out the task he was given in this way, but this was also the way he answered most general questions about what he was doing. 28 See Weber's "Vocation Lectures" in Weber, Gerth, and Mills (1958, 77-129) . 29
In nearly two decades of studying Hui populations in China, I have observed that the prevalence of wearing the skullcap has increased. 30
For a few months this was popular in the nearby villages as something novel and playful, with many in nearby villages trying to get in on the action by trying out versions of "Hasa-la-mu-lei-gu, wo-e-lei-gu-mu-sa-la-mu" on Hui, non-Hui, visiting tourists, county officials, and anthropologists. 31
Principal Ma is also a rare informant who, knowing that the topic of Muslims in Yunnan is an irrationally sensitive one, nonetheless specifically requested that I use his proper name should I ever write about or cite him. 32 I believe this to be Ma Xiaoxiong himself, though McCarthy does not name him. 33
There is a histrionic quality to Israeli's conclusions that, maddeningly, detracts from his earlier ethnological material. My experience with Muslims in China since 1992 has caused me to be suspicious of any suggestion that Islamic radicalism constitutes a threat in China simply because Muslims are somehow structurally incompatible with the Chinese (see Israeli and Gardner-Rush 2000) . 34
Rigorous scholarship on these events has demonstrated that they (a) were not rebellions, and (b) were not (at least originally) about Muslims fighting against the state or nonMuslims (see Lipman 1998 and Atwill 2006) .
